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Introduction 
The development community now appreciates the importance of institutions 
and the incentives they create. Indeed, the most recent World Development Report
opens with the following quote from Douglass North: “We must create incentives 
for people to invest in more effi cient technology, increase their skills, and organize 
effi cient markets. Such incentives are embodied in institutions.”1 
Much work examines the impact of institutions and incentives within develop-
ing countries. In particular, I will discuss two cases, each identifying a problem of 
perverse incentives created by current institutions, and then discusses a potential 
alternative set of institutions that might address the problems. The fi rst concerns 
pharmaceuticals and the second the debts of dictators.
1. Incentives for R&D on Diseases of the Poor 
Many development assistance institutions are organized on a country basis. 
This institutional structure leads to an under-emphasis on assistance for global 
public goods. One such global public good is knowledge; since many countries 
share its benefi ts, no single country or development assistance institution has 
suffi cient incentive to encourage knowledge development. We will look at the 
consequences of the under-provision of the global public good of knowledge on 
the health problems of developing countries.
Given that development of a malaria or AIDS vaccine would be a global public 
good in which no single country has adequate incentive to invest, R&D focused 
on vaccines seems like a natural candidate for development assistance. However, 
the world currently lacks appropriate institutions to encourage research and de-
velopment on vaccines for diseases of the poor.2 
The World Health Organization (2001) estimates that malaria, tuberculosis, 
and the strains of HIV prevalent in Africa kill over fi ve million people each year, 
overwhelmingly in poor countries. Yet in spite of to this enormous burden, very 
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little research is directed towards cures for these diseases, especially towards vaccines. 
Potential developers of vaccines that would be appropriate for poor countries fear 
that they would not be able to sell enough of their product at a suffi cient price to 
recoup their research investments. This is both because these diseases primarily 
affect poor countries and because vaccine markets are severely distorted and cur-
rent institutions provide inadequate incentives to overcome the distortions. Let 
us consider the reasons for underinvestment in vaccine R&D, the problem with 
incentives under existing institutions, and the potential for a purchase commit-
ment to address the joint problems of providing access to products and incentives 
for the development of needed products.
Many developing countries have historically provided little or no intellectual 
property-rights protection for pharmaceuticals. This is in part because once drug 
companies have sunk resources into developing vaccines, governments fi nd it attrac-
tive to use their powers as regulators, major purchasers, and arbiters of intellectual 
property rights to obtain products at prices which cover manufacturing costs, but 
not research costs. The recent debate over pricing AIDS drugs in Africa provides 
an example of this dynamic. 
Moreover, since research and development on vaccines for malaria, tuberculosis, 
and HIV/AIDS is a global public good that benefi ts many small countries, no 
single country has an incentive to encourage research by offering higher prices. 
Consequently, there is a huge gap between the low returns that potential vaccine 
developers could expect and the high benefi ts the vaccine, if developed, would 
provide for society. Indeed, most vaccines sold in developing countries sell for a 
fraction of their social value. A malaria vaccine would be worth about $40 per 
person immunized relative to other developing country health programs.3  The 
gap between the $40 at which a vaccine would be cost-effective and the $1 or $2 
that the historical record suggests a vaccine developer would be likely to obtain 
implies that, under current institutions, potential vaccine developers would not 
have incentives to pursue socially valuable research opportunities. 
In practice, very little research is oriented toward diseases that primarily affect 
poor countries, which include tropical diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis. 
Of the 1,233 drugs licensed worldwide between 1975 and 1997, only 13 were 
for tropical diseases. Two of these were modifi cations of existing medicines, two 
were produced for the U.S. military, and fi ve came from veterinary research. Only 
four were developed by commercial pharmaceutical fi rms specifi cally for tropical 
diseases of humans.
Even if development assistance is reoriented towards the global public good of 
encouraging R&D on problems of developing countries, the form such support 
takes will be critical. Institutions to encourage vaccine development could take 
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two broad forms. “Push” programs subsidize research inputs ahead of time, for 
example through R&D tax credits or grants to researchers, while “pull” programs 
reward the development of an actual vaccine after it is proven effective. Economic 
theory suggests that push programs allow people seeking research funding and 
even those within funding institutions to hide relevant information or alter their 
behavior for personal gain. Under a system of grant-fi nanced research, researchers 
may have incentives to report overly optimistic assessments to their superiors or 
to devote effort to other activities, such as publishing articles, rather than to focus 
on development of the desired product. 
These problems with push programs are illustrated by the U.S. Agency for In-
ternational Development’s (USAID) efforts to develop a malaria vaccine. USAID 
overcame the problem of being focused exclusively on individual countries and 
correctly identifi ed one of the most pressing needs of the developing world, but the 
incentive structure it adopted was not suited to the goal of developing a marketable 
vaccine. In 1984 the agency claimed that there had been a “major breakthrough 
in the development of a vaccine against the most deadly form of malaria in hu-
man beings. The vaccine should be ready for use around the world, especially in 
developing countries, within fi ve years.”4  During the USAID program, external 
evaluators suggested that additional funding should not be provided to two of 
the three research teams on which USAID’s funding efforts focused. However, as 
a result of over optimistic information provided by the project director, USAID 
provided substantial new resources to all three teams and was suffi ciently confi dent 
that vaccines would be developed that it even arranged to purchase monkeys with 
which to test a vaccine. Monitoring diffi culties also manifested themselves in the 
form of corruption. Two of three researchers transferred grant funds into private 
accounts and the project director received kickbacks for the contract to purchase 
monkeys. By the end of the project, USAID had spent $60 million on its malaria 
vaccine effort with few results. Though the criminal activity is unusual, this example 
illustrates the vulnerability of push programs in general to unrealistic optimism 
and monitoring problems. A pull approach would better align researchers’ incen-
tives with USAID’s goals. 
Under pull programs, some public organization promise to pay for a successful 
drug but pays nothing unless a viable product is developed. These programs have 
several attractive features relative to traditional push programs for encouraging 
the later stages of vaccine development. They give researchers incentives to self-
select projects with a reasonable chance of yielding a viable product rather than to 
oversell their research prospects to research administrators and the public. They 
allow politicians and the public to be confi dent that they are paying for an actual 
product rather than supporting a development effort that might not be warranted 
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scientifi cally. Pull programs also provide strong fi nancial incentives for researchers 
to focus on developing a marketable product rather than pursuing other goals, 
such as publishing articles. Finally, appropriately designed pull programs can help 
ensure that if new products are developed, they will reach those who need them. 
For example, developed countries or private foundations could commit to purchase 
malaria vaccine at $5 per immunized person and to make it available to developing 
countries either for free or in return for a modest co-payment. 
Designing a Purchase Commitment
The design of a purchase commitment will be a critical determinant of its 
effectiveness. If potential developers are to invest in research, they must believe 
that once they have sunk funds into developing a desired product, the sponsors 
of a purchase program will not renege on their commitments but will pay a price 
that covers both the cost of manufacturing and research. Courts have held that 
similar public commitments to reward contest winners or to purchase specifi ed 
goods constitute legally binding contracts and that the decisions of independent 
parties appointed in advance to adjudicate such programs are binding. For ex-
ample, in the 1960s the U.S. government pledged to purchase, at a minimum 
price, domestically produced manganese. After the world price of the commodity 
fell and the General Services Administration (GSA), the U.S. executive agency 
in charge of administering the program, attempted to renege, U.S. courts forced 
the GSA to honor the commitment. The credibility of a purchase commitment 
can be enhanced by clearly specifying eligibility and pricing rules and insulating 
decision makers from political pressure through long terms of service.
If donor governments, international organizations, or private foundations com-
mit to purchase a future vaccine, they should set out in advance the principles for 
determining the eligibility of candidate vaccines for purchase and the price they 
would be willing to pay for a vaccine. Eligibility conditions for candidate products 
would likely include some minimal technical requirements that would ordinarily 
include clearance by a regulatory agency, such as the U.S. Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA). They might then be subject to a market test: nations wishing 
to purchase products might be required to provide a modest co-payment tied to 
their per capita income. Requiring countries that receive vaccines to provide co-
payments in exchange for the product would give countries incentives to carefully 
investigate whether candidate products are appropriate for their local conditions. 
Any product meeting the technical requirements and attracting requests from 
developing countries would be eligible for purchase. 
A purchase commitment could also include a system of bonus payments. To 
provide potential developers with a credible commitment, the program would need 
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to specify a base price which would be paid for vaccines meeting the technical 
requirements and the market test. However, it would be desirable for developers 
to have incentives to develop products that exceed such a minimum threshold. 
To some extent, this incentive will be provided by the threat of competition from 
superior products being developed by other companies. However, it would also 
be useful to have a system of bonus payments that would depend on the quality 
of the product. Guaranteeing a base price for products which met a basic standard 
would provide the necessary reassurance to potential developers, while a system 
of bonus payments for products which exceeded this standard would preserve the 
benefi ts of fl exibility. 
Pricing and Cost of a Commitment
Given the enormous burden of diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, and 
HIV/AIDS, it is important to provide suffi cient incentive for many researchers 
to enter the fi eld and to induce major pharmaceutical fi rms to pursue several po-
tential leads simultaneously so that products can be developed quickly. Moreover, 
given the limited cost-effectiveness of current products for these diseases and the 
diffi culty of improving prevention through behavioral change, there is little risk 
that payments made as a result of a purchase commitment could exceed the cost 
of saving the equivalent number of lives using today’s treatments or expanded 
prevention programs. 
Estimates indicate that a $250 to $500 million real annual market is needed to 
motivate substantial research. The nominal size of a purchase commitment made 
now should be larger, perhaps beginning around $330 million per year to ac-
commodate infl ation, given that vaccines may not be developed for some time. A 
commitment at this level would be extremely cost effective, costing approximately 
$4 per year of life saved. Over ten years about 1.9 billion discounted disability 
adjusted life years (DALYs)5  could be saved (which is equivalent to saving the lives 
of around 63 million thirty-year olds) at a cost of approximately $4 per year of 
life saved. In comparison, anti-retroviral treatment of AIDS is estimated to cost 
$1100 per person per year and, since treatment would not be perfectly effective, 
the cost per year of life saved is likely to be considerably greater. 
The details of which vaccine sales would qualify would be worked out by USAID 
under this program, and the details of their procedures will be quite important for 
the effect of the program. Biotech and pharmaceutical fi rms are more likely to fi nd 
the commitment credible if, once the needed funding legislation is passed, USAID 
quickly specifi es guidelines for how it will allocate credits. In particular, USAID 
would need to specify how it will address issues of vaccine pricing (presumably, it 
would not approve credit allocations for a small quantity of vaccine sold at tens 
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of thousands of dollars per person immunized), how much of the fund could be 
spent on a vaccine that is currently far along in research, such as the pneumococcus 
vaccine, and what procedures would be used to allocate credits if multiple versions 
of a vaccine were available. 
The World Bank president, James Wolfensohn, has also said that the institution 
plans to create a $1 billion fund to help countries purchase specifi ed vaccines if 
and when they are developed. However, the World Bank has yet to act on this 
commitment. Some within the Bank have advocated a more general program to 
combat communicable diseases of the poor. However, for a general program to 
stimulate research, it must include an explicit commitment to help fi nance the 
purchase of new vaccines if and when they are developed. Without an explicit 
commitment along the lines proposed by Wolfensohn, it is unlikely that the large-
scale investments needed to develop vaccines will be undertaken. 
Private foundations could also play a major role in creating markets for new 
vaccines. Foundations may fi nd it easier than governments to commit credibly to 
future vaccine purchases, given their greater continuity of leadership. For instance, 
the Gates Foundation, with $22 billion in assets and a focus on children’s health in 
developing countries and vaccines in particular, is well placed to forward a vaccine 
purchase commitment. While continuing to fund its other priorities, a foundation 
could put its principal to use in encouraging vaccine research simply by pledging 
that if a vaccine were actually developed, the foundation would purchase and 
distribute it in developing countries. 
Thus, any of several organizations—including national governments, the World 
Bank, and private foundations—have the ability to create a credible purchase 
commitment to stimulate vaccine research. If such a commitment fails to induce 
the development of the needed products, no funds would be spent. If it succeeds, 
millions of lives would be saved each year at a cost of a few dollars each.
2. Odious Debt 
Sovereign debt is another area where it would be benefi cial to review the current 
norms and institutional structures. Current institutions provide incentives and 
opportunity for dictators to borrow internationally, loot the funds, and leave the 
debt to be repaid by successor governments and ultimately their people. Simply 
allowing countries to renounce debt ex post (afterwards) would also provide inap-
propriate incentives, but an international institution that ruled on the legitimacy 
of debt ex ante (ahead of time) would provide better incentives. 
When the United States gained control of Cuba in 1898 after the Spanish-
American War, it repudiated the debt accumulated by Cuba under Spanish rule. 
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The arguments made by the U.S. during peace negotiations are the origins of the 
doctrine of odious debt. The U.S. claimed that the U.S. and/or Cuba should not 
bear the obligations because, fi rst, the debt had been “imposed upon the people 
of Cuba without their consent”; second, it had not “been incurred for the benefi t 
of the Cuban people”; and, third, “the creditors, from the beginning, took the 
chances of the investment.”6  Spain never accepted the validity of the U.S. argu-
ments, but the U.S. implicitly prevailed, with Spain taking responsibility for the 
Cuban debt under the peace treaty. 
Legal scholars have elaborated a doctrine of odious debt, using defi nitions that 
parallel the U.S. arguments quoted above. They argue that sovereign debt is odi-
ous if (1) its purpose does not benefi t the people and (2) it is incurred without 
the consent of the people. Some scholars argue that odious debt incurred by one 
government should not be transferable to a successor government. Others hold 
that debt should remain transferable unless (3) creditors were aware in advance 
that (1) and (2) held. Just as an individual does not have to repay if someone 
borrows in her name, the argument is that the population is not responsible for 
illegitimate loans taken out by the government. The doctrine would give banks a 
disincentive to lend to odious governments in the fi rst place, since the loans would 
not be recognized and repaid by successor regimes. 
Loans to the apartheid government in South Africa are an interesting recent 
case. The apartheid regime borrowed from abroad in part to build up its military 
and police and otherwise repress the African majority. Private banks continued 
to lend to the South African government during the 1980s. The Archbishop of 
Cape Town has since campaigned for apartheid-era debt to “be declared odious 
and written off,” and South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission also 
questioned whether the post-apartheid government was responsible for repayment 
of the “odious debt.” The South African government, however, has not endorsed 
this position. When apartheid was being dismantled in 1993, future-President 
Nelson Mandela called for the world to normalize economic relations with South 
Africa, and three days later the fi nance minister announced at an investor confer-
ence in New York that South Africa would repay its sovereign debt. It seems that 
the new leadership of South Africa was concerned about building a reputation for 
playing by the rules of capitalism, and it worried that defaulting on debt would 
hurt its chances of attracting new foreign investment. 
There are other cases in which corrupt dictators borrow from abroad, expropriate 
the funds for personal use, and leave the debts to the population they had ruled. 
For example, under Mobutu Sese Seko, the former Zaïre accumulated over $12 
billion in sovereign debt, while Mobutu diverted public funds to his personal ac-
counts (his assets reached $4 billion in the mid-1980s) and to his efforts to retain 
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power (e.g., payments to cronies, military expenses). Similarly, when Ferdinand 
Marcos lost power in 1986, the Philippines owed $28 billion to foreign creditors, 
and Marcos’ personal wealth was estimated at $10 billion. Lending to governments 
without regard for their odiousness thus seems to be the status quo of international 
lending. Under the existing system, banks lend to governments including those of 
apartheid South Africa and Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua. Some odious regimes 
such as that of Charles Taylor in Liberia do not receive loans from commercial 
banks, but this seems to be because the regime is following policies that make 
lending risky, and not because of odiousness per se. 
Under the status quo, successor governments typically accept responsibility for 
debt, even if the predecessor regime is regarded as odious. Looting is not a valid 
excuse for failure to repay. Countries are deterred from default either through sanc-
tions such as seizure of assets or through loss of reputation and governments fear 
that they will face these penalties even if their non-repayment is made from the 
high moral ground. For example, South Africa has not repudiated the apartheid-era 
debt. In Nicaragua, the Sandinista government came close to repudiating Somoza’s 
debt but reconsidered when their allies in Cuba advised them that doing so would 
alienate them from Western capitalist countries and was unwise. 
One reason that the doctrine of odious debt has not gained wide recognition 
under international law is a concern that it would create a slippery slope. Gov-
ernments lie on a continuum in the extent to which they do or do not have the 
consent of the people and do or do not spend for their benefi t. A leading legal 
scholar writes, “the concept of odious debts tends to be expanded as States seek a 
pretext for avoiding obligations which otherwise would be imposed upon them, 
and for this reason it is essential strictly to limit it.”7  It seems diffi cult to avoid 
the danger of shutting down international capital fl ows entirely if it is left to the 
debtor country to determine ex post whether debt qualifi es as odious. The Mexican 
government could disavow debts run up during the era of PRI domination, or 
a future U.S. government could renounce debts incurred before the passage of 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965. If, instead, the creditor assesses odiousness, it will 
tend to fi nd governments non-odious. An outside judge also might falsely label 
previous governments as odious if it values the welfare of indebted countries. Once 
a loan has been granted, the judge could shift part of a country’s debt burden to 
creditors by calling the debt odious. This creates a time-consistency problem, since 
sovereign lending would dry up if creditors anticipated that their loans would be 
branded odious. It is clear that the best solution is for some independent group 
or institution to judge if the government is offi cially odious.
While the status quo creates inappropriate incentives for dictators to borrow 
even when this is not in the interests of their people, and for foreign creditors to 
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lend to them, an alternative in which debt was ruled odious ex post (i.e. after the 
loans are made) might also create inappropriate incentives and so would be a bad 
idea. Although a deciding Institution biased in favor of either poor countries or 
their creditors might tend to judge dishonestly ex post (i.e. when it rules on exist-
ing debt), it is more likely to judge honestly ex ante (i.e., ahead of time), i.e. when 
its rules on futures loans to a particular government. An Institution that ruled ex 
ante would be much less subject to biases that were in favor of either creditors or 
the population as a whole. If the Institution favors the population of the country, 
it would wish to allow appropriate loans, but not inappropriate ones. Even if the 
Institution favored creditors, it would not have a particularly strong incentive to 
permit inappropriate loans ex ante, because in a competitive capital market, credi-
tors do not make substantial profi ts ex ante. 
The Institution could work in one of two ways, either with no formal power 
other than declaring regimes odious, or it could have the power to block seizure of 
assets. If the Institution assesses and publicly identifi es regimes as odious, lending 
to odious regimes could be curtailed because successor governments who repudiate 
odious debt face no reputational loss. It is possible that just announcing that a 
dictatorial government is odious might create a new equilibrium in which nobody 
lends because they know that it would not be repaid. If somebody did lend to an 
odious regime, then failure to repay would not be interpreted by the international 
community as a negative mark against the country, and its reputation would be 
intact to borrow in the future. 
This type of sanction is self-enforcing and thus might be more effective than 
trade sanctions as a weapon against dictators. Third countries have incentives to 
break sanctions, and smugglers have incentives to evade them. In contrast, banks 
would not have an incentive to lend to a ruler who had been declared odious, 
since a successor government would face little danger of seized assets or loss of 
reputation if it refused to honor the debts of the odious regime. Such an Institu-
tion might also have favorable incentive effects on dictators and would-be dicta-
tors. Dictators might choose to cut back on their looting rather than risk being 
declared odious and losing borrowing privileges. Moreover, there might be fewer 
coups and odious regimes in the fi rst place if potential dictators expected to be 
spurned by creditors.
However, this Institution might still be biased in favor of or against particular 
governments. A bias in favor of a government, i.e. a reluctance to deem it odi-
ous, might arise if the government is an ally or an important trading partner of 
a powerful nation, a patron, that has infl uence on the Institution’s decision. For 
example, it is unlikely the Institution would blacklist Saudi Arabia or China, 
regardless of their misdeeds. A more serious problem arises if the Institution is 
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biased against a particular government for ideological reasons. In this situation, 
the Institution might term the government odious even if in fact it is not. This 
would lead to inappropriate denial of loans. It would therefore be important to 
design the Institution in a way that protects against dishonest judgments due to 
bias against particular non-odious governments.
The voting rules of the Institution could act as safeguards against such bias. 
In particular, if the voting rule required a supermajority among the members to 
judge a regime odious, the decisive voter is less biased against the government than 
under a simple majority rule. The cost of this rule is that there will be more false 
negatives, since odious regimes favored by a minority of judges will be cleared by 
the Institution. Another provision to safeguard against biased judgments is to have 
an Institution composed of professional jurists with lengthy tenure. Such judges 
may be less beholden to the political agendas of their home countries. One also 
may want to tie the Institution’s hands by using a narrow defi nition of odious. 
There certainly are examples where creditor countries widely condemned a 
particular regime yet commercial banks continued to lend to the regime. These 
would be the instances in which the Institution could publicly declare the regime 
odious, even under the narrow defi nition of odiousness, and discourage com-
mercial lending to it. Franjo Tudjman of Croatia was arguably such an odious 
ruler. In 1997, the International Monetary Fund cut off aid that was earmarked 
for Croatia, at the behest of the U.S., Germany, and Britain. The reason cited 
was the “unsatisfactory state of democracy in Croatia”. By this time, Tudjman 
was thought to be suppressing the media and looting public funds. Meanwhile, 
commercial banks lent an additional $2 billion to the Croatian government 
between the IMF censure and Tudjman’s death in December 1999. If an Institu-
tion had publicly declared the regime odious at the time of the IMF freeze and 
enforcement mechanisms were in place (i.e. non-repayment of subsequent loans 
to Tudjman was a condition for foreign aid to future Croatian governments and 
non-repayment could not be punished with seizure of assets), the $2 billion in 
debt that probably was not benefi cial to the Croatian people who now bear the 
debt, might not have been lent.
 The system proposed could be implemented without an international Institu-
tion but solely using domestic courts and policies. Or the Institution could be the 
U.N. Security Council. The key is that the judgment be made. 
To summarize, an Institution could deter lending to governments that do not 
have the consent of the people and spend against their interests, such as that of 
apartheid South Africa. The people ruled by an odious regime would be better off, 
since they would not be saddled by debts that were illegitimate in the fi rst place. 
With enforcement mechanisms, such as an International Monetary Fund policy of 
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withholding foreign aid if a successor government does not repudiate debt declared 
odious by the Institution or if the Institution blocks seizure of assets for odious 
debt, one potentially could eliminate lending to governments deemed odious. If 
the Institution is suffi ciently concerned about justice and rules constrain it to err 
on the side of assessing regimes as non-odious, some undesirable lending would 
still occur, but any deterrence of odious debt would be an improvement over the 
status quo. The type of sanction described is self-enforcing—banks would have 
little incentive to circumvent it and lend to an odious regime. Also, governments 
might decide to loot less to stay off the blacklist, and would-be dictators might 
be discouraged from seeking power if sovereign borrowing is not one of the spoils 
of offi ce.
3. Conclusions
The importance of incentives and the institutions that create them in the develop-
ment process has long been recognized. Here I have argued that it is worth applying 
similar institutional and incentives-based analysis to development assistance policy 
and more broadly to policy toward the developing world. These programs must 
be well designed, but they hold out signifi cant promise in developing benefi cial 
drugs and avoiding odious debt.
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